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Ninth Special Report 
On 23 July 2009 the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee published its 
Eighth Report of Session 2008–09, Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of 
Government Policy [HC 168–I]. On 14 October 2009 the Science and Technology 
Committee received a memorandum from the Government which contained a response to 
the Report. The memorandum is published as appendix 1 to this Report. 
The list of conclusions and recommendations at pages 63 to 69 of the Committee’s Report 
contained several errors.  A corrected list is published at appendix 2. 
 
Appendix 1: Government response 
The Government welcomes the Committee’s report and its focus on the role of science and 
engineering in government. 
The bulk of this document responds to the specific recommendations contained in the 
Committee’s report. Overall a clear consensus emerged during the evidence sessions 
regarding the importance of science and engineering to effective policymaking, economic 
growth and quality of life. 
The Government fundamentally agrees with the importance of putting science and 
engineering at the heart of government policy. The Government also agrees with the 
Committee that progress has been made in this regard but there is more to be done to 
ensure that every decision is based on the best available evidence. 
We will maintain high levels of investment in the research base and fundamental science, 
and in HE more generally. 
This response has been prepared by the Government Office for Science (GO-Science), with 
input from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the Department for 
Children Schools and Families (DCSF) and the Medicine and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA). 
Science and engineering at the heart of government policy?  
1. We were impressed by the Science Minister and Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser’s frank assessment of how science and engineering advice is used in 
Government. We were pleased to hear that they have taken up those concerns we raised 
in the engineering report and that they have an appetite to improve the use of evidence 
in policy-making. (Paragraph 24) 
The Government welcomes the Committee’s recognition of the work undertaken by Lord 
Drayson and Professor Beddington to champion science and engineering in government, 
and to embed science and engineering advice in the process of policy-making.  
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The Government remains committed to the formulation and delivery of evidence-based 
policy. Both the Minister for Science and Innovation and Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser (GCSA) are working with government departments to embed independent science 
and engineering advice in the policy-making process. 
2. We regret that the Government failed to answer the core reasons for having 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers. We urge the Government to give fuller 
consideration to our recommendation that “Some departments should have 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief 
Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), and some should have both.” (Paragraph 29) 
The Government does not agree that it failed to consider sufficiently the Committee’s 
recommendation that Chief Engineering Advisers be appointed to government 
departments. While the Government considers the provision of engineering advice 
necessary and important, this function is already contained within the remit of the 
Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers. 
The Government’s reasons for not appointing Chief Engineering Advisers remain as 
outlined in the Government response to the Committee’s report Engineering: turning ideas 
into reality: 
[…] DCSAs cover both science and engineering as part of their remits; it is part of this 
role to ensure that each department has sufficient expertise and capacity to manage and 
use the engineering advice it needs. It is also noteworthy that the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD), the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the Department for 
Transport (DfT), the Department for International Development (DFID)1 and 
Communities and Local Government (CLG) currently have engineers and/or Fellows 
of the Royal Academy of Engineering (FREngs) in the DCSA role. […] They are not 
appointed for their personal specialist expertise (although this may often be valuable), 
but rather for their ability to marshal advice from all of the other specialists, both inside 
and outside Government, to provide whatever scientific advice their Department 
requires across the full spectrum of science and engineering. 
The Government does not therefore accept the case for separate Chief Engineering 
Advisers at Government-wide or departmental levels. 
The important thing is that science and engineering advice is properly reflected in the 
decision making process, and on this, as set out above, the Government shares the 
Committee’s view that while progress is being made, there is more to be done. 
Drawing on the Science and Engineering Assurance exercises, the Science Minister and the 
GCSA will work with colleagues on the ED(SI) Cabinet Sub-Committee to establish where 
in Government additional engineering resource is needed and how best to provide it. 
Within BIS, for example, the CSA is currently reviewing the process by which the 
Department ensures science, engineering and particularly technology advice is used 
appropriately in policy development and implementation. 
 
1 To note that since the Government responded to the Committee’s report Engineering: turning ideas into reality, due 
to a change of postholder it is no longer the case that the DfID DCSA has an engineering background. 
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3. The Government had an opportunity at the last reshuffle to move GO-Science as 
per our recommendation in the engineering report. That it did not, was a missed 
opportunity. As the Government Chief Scientific Adviser explained, location matters 
because it affords daily face-to-face interaction between colleagues in the same 
building; and as he further pointed out, he has only seen the Prime Minster four times 
in the past year. We therefore appeal directly to the Prime Minster, who is responsible 
for GO-Science, to bring it into the Cabinet Office alongside the Strategy Unit. 
(Paragraph 37)  
The Prime Minister shares the GCSA’s view that GO-Science is best located within BIS and 
does not recognise Committee’s assessment of his engagement with the GCSA as ‘woefully 
inadequate’. The GCSA provides the Prime Minister with advice in a form, and at a time 
and level, appropriate to the matter in hand. Neither the Prime Minister nor the GCSA are 
convinced by the need for advice to be routinely delivered in person. However, regular 
meetings are now being put in place to ensure that the Prime Minister stays abreast of all 
the issues and is made aware of any concerns held by the GCSA.  
As the GCSA points out, the co-location of GO-Science and BIS facilitates his close 
working with the Minister for Science and Innovation and Director General for Science 
and Research. The Government would like to assure the Committee, however, that the 
GCSA enjoys strong links with departments across Whitehall, not least with the Cabinet 
Office. As co-chair of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), for example, 
the GCSA attends Ministerial Civil Contingency Committee (CCC) meetings (within 
COBR). Further, the GCSA regularly engages with Sir Gus O’Donnell (Head of the Home 
Civil Service), and with Permanent Secretaries and Chief Scientific Advisers across 
government. 
Similarly, the Committee should be assured that officials in GO-Science have strong links 
with officials in No 10, the Cabinet Office and other government departments. 
The Committee comments that the distinction between GO-Science and its parent 
department is unclear on occasion (Paragraph 36). This is a helpful observation and one 
which reinforces the need for activities already initiated to communicate better the position 
of GO-Science as a semi-autonomous unit with a cross-government remit. 
4. We are reassured to hear that Professor Beddington will take steps to look at the 
MHRA’s decision to licence homeopathic products as well as the wider issue of the 
purchasing of homeopathy by the NHS. We hope that he will be able to bring scientific 
evidence to the centre of this complex policy issue. (Paragraph 42)  
The GCSA is concerned that the licensing of homeopathic remedies might be taken to 
imply clinical efficacy. He wrote to the MHRA requesting clarification on the licensing of 
homeopathic products. The information the GCSA received from the MHRA is 
summarised below. 
Homeopathic medicinal products are included in the scope of European Directives and 
the Medicines Act 1968. Under current licensing arrangements, homeopathic products 
either: have Product Licences of Right (PLRs); have been granted certificates under the 
Simplified Scheme; or have been granted homeopathic marketing authorizations under 
the National Rules Scheme.  
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PLRs are licences issued to all products on the market at the time that the Medicines 
Act 1968 was implemented in 1971. Legislation requires PLRs to be reviewed over a 
7 year period from 01 September 2006 (as a result of introducing the National Rules 
Scheme).  
The Simplified Scheme for homeopathic medicinal products was introduced in 1992 
under European Directive 92/73/EC. The scheme is regarded as simplified because 
there is no requirement in the Directive for data to demonstrate clinical efficacy and the 
eligibility criteria confer a certain reassurance on safety. The Simplified Scheme does 
not permit therapeutic indications to be stated on the product label.  
In 2006, the UK introduced the National Rules Scheme allowing the marketing of 
homeopathic products under European Directive 2001/83. Directive 2001/83/EEC, as 
amended, is specific to homeopathic products and recognises the principles and 
characteristics of homoeopathy as practised within the individual Member States. Only 
products which are indicated for the relief of minor symptoms and minor conditions in 
humans are eligible for a homeopathic marketing authorization under the scheme. For 
these purposes, minor symptoms are those which can ordinarily and with reasonable 
safety be relieved or treated without the supervision or intervention of a doctor. 
Additional warnings appear on the packaging instructing the patient to seek medical 
help if symptoms do not improve.  
The National Rules Scheme does not endorse clinical efficacy of homeopathic products, 
as clinical efficacy is understood in the context of conventional pharmaceutical 
medicines. Rather, it addresses previous inconsistencies in the marketing of 
homeopathic products in the UK. Previously, for example, manufacturers with Product 
Licences of Right (PLRs) were able to market a wider range of product dosage forms 
and dilutions—and give indications—whereas manufacturers with registration 
certificates for the same products under the Simplified Scheme were not necessarily 
permitted to include any therapeutic use on the labelling. 
Arnica Pillules have been available on the UK market as a homeopathic medicinal 
product without indications for many years. The Nelson's arnica product is the only 
product to be authorised under the National Rules scheme to date. In accordance with 
the requirements of the National Rules Scheme, the applicant submitted a dossier 
demonstrating the safety and quality of the product as well as information on the usage 
of the product within the UK homeopathic tradition for the indications sought. Safety 
and quality are monitored during the life cycle of the product in similar terms to 
pharmaceutical medicines with full marketing authorisations. The product packaging 
for arnica has undergone full user testing to ensure that the most important key 
messages for safe use of the product are conveyed to the consumer in a user-friendly 
manner.  
The GCSA would like to reassure the Committee that product licenses granted do not 
indicate clinical endorsement for any treatment, but provide a regulatory context in 
relation to product safety. He is persuaded that a system able to regulate claims made in 
marketing homeopathic products is potentially of benefit, but recognises that this does not 
address the issue of individuals taking medicines that are of no clinical benefit. He will 
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monitor current arrangements and watch for any evidence that such a scheme unduly 
encourages the use of such remedies in place of more appropriate medical treatment. 
On the purchasing of homeopathic medicines by the NHS, the GCSA has been in contact 
with the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) to discuss this matter. The CMO indicated that the 
cost of homeopathic prescriptions dispensed by the NHS represented a very small 
proportion of the total drugs bill. The Committee should be assured that discussions 
between the Department of Health and the GCSA on this matter are ongoing, having only 
been recently interrupted as a result of priority work on the Government’s response to 
swine flu. 
5. We call on the DCSF Chief Scientific Adviser to explain what advice she provided, 
if any, on the Every Child literacy and numeracy programmes and report it to the 
House. (Paragraph 47) 
DCSF is committed to evidence-based policy-making and the effective use of scientific 
advice. The current DCSF CSA, Carole Willis, joined the department in August 2008, and 
so was not in post when many of the Every Child literacy and numeracy programme 
decisions were taken. However, she has a specific remit to ensure that robust evidence and 
analysis is used consistently across the department in its policy development. The CSA 
chairs the Department’s Research Approvals Committee, which scrutinises all research and 
evaluation proposals to test their scientific rigour before funding is approved. The CSA also 
chairs the Policy Evaluation Group (which investigated and approved the evaluation of the 
“Every Child a Reader” initiative earlier in the year) and oversees development and delivery 
of the Department’s Analysis and Evidence Strategy (published on 20th July 2009).  
The CSA advises Ministers on the content of the forward looking research programme and 
the scientific integrity and validity of research and evaluation. She actively challenges the 
department on the evidence base for its policies, and sits on several of the department’s 
decision making Boards. More generally, the DCSF analytical community work on behalf 
of the CSA to ensure that evidence underpins policy development decisions across the 
department. There are 210 professional analysts within the Department (economists, 
operational researchers, social researchers and statisticians) which provides DCSF with a 
solid analytical base.  
The Department is providing specific support on literacy and numeracy to an increasing 
number of local authorities and schools in England, targeted on greatest need. These are 
focussed through the following intervention programmes: Every Child a Reader (ECaR), 
Every Child a Writer (ECaW), Every Child Counts (ECC) and Every Child a Talker 
(ECaT). The ECaR programme was piloted between 2005 and 2008 and, informed by 
findings from a range of academic research and analysis, is being rolled out nationally on 
an incremental basis. The other initiatives are being piloted or rolled out incrementally, 
with advice from DCSF analysts, in order to build a strong evidence base for future 
decisions about funding. The CSA has ensured that ECaR, ECC and ECaW undergo a 
rigorous evaluation process, and is in the process of exploring how ECaT should be 
evaluated, and the lessons learned. DSCF analysts will ensure that the results are used to 
inform the future of these programmes. DCSF would welcome the opportunity to provide 
the committee with full details on the evidence base and evaluation activity if they wish. 
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6. We agree with Professor Beddington that Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers 
should have devolved responsibility for the quality of scientific advice in each 
department. On that basis, it is crucial that each DCSA has a tight grip on their 
departmental remits and have sufficient support so that problem policy areas can be 
identified and dealt with. The DCSA must challenge policy-makers to demonstrate 
clear evidence to support policy or to acknowledge that no such evidence exists. The 
GCSA needs to be advised by DCSAs of those instances where DCSAs have been 
overruled on such matters; and we further recommend that he publishes these in his 
annual report. (Paragraph 48) 
The Government is confident in the ability of its Chief Scientific Advisers effectively 
support and challenge policy-making in their home departments. As the Committee 
rightly acknowledges, however, science and engineering evidence will only ever be one of 
the factors that influences the form and focus of government policy.  
It is the Government’s view that the full range of evidence used to inform policy-making 
should be made publicly available whenever possible. Given this will encompass science 
and engineering advice received, the Government is not persuaded of the need to publish 
details of occasions when departmental policy outputs have or have not fully reflected the 
Chief Scientists’ advice. 
The Government’s commitment to transparent policy-making is described in the 
Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy-making: 
In line with the Freedom of Information Act, there should be a presumption at every 
stage towards openness and transparency in the publication of expert advice. 
Departments should also ensure their procedures for obtaining advice are open and 
transparent. It is good practice to publish the underpinning evidence for a new policy 
decision, particularly as part of an accompanying press release. […] When publishing 
the evidence the analysis and judgment that went into it, any important omissions in 
the data, should be clearly documented and identified as such. This should be done in a 
way that is meaningful to the non-expert. 
7. Strong consideration should be given to increasing the number of departments 
that have Science Advisory Councils with a departmental remit. The Department of 
Health, the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Department for 
Transport are obvious ‘top-of-the-list’ candidates, with the latter two in particular 
needing high quality engineering advice. (Paragraph 54) 
The GCSA has made public his view that government departments benefit from having an 
SA Council, and that he is exploring the potential establishment of SA Councils across a 
broader range of government departments.  
The Government welcomes the Committee’s support for this agenda, and is pleased to 
report that, since the Committee started its inquiry, DCMS has announced plans to 
introduce such an advisory structure.  
The potential to embed the model of an SA Council across government departments was 
considered at the September meeting of the Chief Scientific Advisors Committee (CSAC). 
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Officials in GO-Science will be acting on the outputs of this meeting to progress this 
programme of work.  
8. SAC members should not be criticised for publishing scientific papers or making 
statements as professionals, independent of their role as Government advisers. 
(Paragraph 64) 
The Government agrees that the independence of science advisers is critical. It was 
precisely for this reason that the GCSA wrote to then-Home Secretary Jacqui Smith to 
express concern over her criticism, in Parliament, of Professor Nutt (Chairman of ACMD) 
with regard to an article he published in a peer-reviewed journal. 
Since the then-Home Secretary’s criticism of Professor Nutt, at least one SA Council, 
DefraSAC, has recruited a number of new members. As Professor Gaskell (Chair of 
DefraSAC) informed the Committee, applications were received from a large number of 
high calibre candidates. 
The Government is not complacent, however, and as part of its annual monitoring of the 
health and functioning of SACs, all SACs, and their sponsor Chief Scientific Adviser, have 
been asked to report on succession planning and issues faced or identified in recruiting 
new members. Responses to this year’s exercise are currently being collated and will be 
considered at the December meeting of the Chief Scientific Advisers Committee. The 
Government would be happy to report the findings of this exercise to the Committee.  
9. It is important to safeguard the independence of the advisory system. In situations 
where the independence of a SAC chairman or member is or might be threatened for 
political reasons, support should be offered by the DCSA and/or the GCSA. (Paragraph 
67) 
10. We welcome the steps taken by the GCSA to deal with one incident that occurred 
between the Chairman of the ACMD and the Home Secretary. Further steps that 
should have been taken are: (1) the GSCA should have written or spoken to the 
Chairman of the ACMD, letting him know that support was being provided; (2) the 
correspondence between the GCSA and the Home Secretary should have been 
published immediately so that other SAC Chairmen and the public (including the 
science community) could see that support was being offered; and (3) the GCSA should 
have provided public support for the Chairman of the ACMD and for his right to 
publish. (Paragraph 68) 
The Government is committed to the provision of independent scientific advice, and to 
supporting the mechanisms and structures by which this advice is delivered. This is 
evidenced by its ongoing work to embed science and engineering advice in policy-making 
processes across government (through the appointment of CSAs and establishment of SA 
Councils, for example).  
The Committee can be assured that the GCSA will take steps to support SAC Chairs and 
SAC members should he believe that their independence is being impinged upon. The 
Government does not, however consider it likely that instances of this occurring will be 
widespread or accept that the GCSA should routinely publish correspondence with SAC 
chairs, SAC members or Ministers. On the issue of public support, the GCSA will decide 
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on the most effective action for dealing with any discord between the advice offered by 
SACs and the development of government policy. 
11. The Government should seek specialist advice prior to making policy decisions, 
early in the policy-making process. Clearly the Government should be free to reject the 
advice of its SACs, since scientific evidence is only one factor—albeit a very important 
one—in policy decisions: Advisers advise, Ministers decide. However, when the 
Government does take a different policy decision to that recommended by a SAC, it 
should make clear its reasons for doing so. (Paragraph 69) 
The Committee correctly identifies that science (and engineering) evidence is only one of 
the factors that Ministers take into account when reaching a policy decision. As outlined in 
the Government’s response to Recommendation 6 of this report, the Government has a 
long-held view that the evidence-base for any policy decision should be made publicly 
available and that, when the decision runs contrary to independent advice received 
(irrespective of the advisory structure), the reasons for rejecting this advice be outlined.  
Guidance on when to seek expert science and engineering advice, and to publish this 
advice, is provided in the Government’s Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy-making. 
The Government is currently acting to update this document and will be launching a 
public consultation on the guidelines later this year. The Government would welcome 
consultation input from the Committee. 
12. We conclude that there would be value in being clear in the Code of Practice as to 
what ‘independence’ means. Members of Science Advisory Committees are likely to 
represent the views of their constituencies; what is important is that they have no 
conflict of interest with Government. Therefore, in the case of Science Advisory 
Committees, ‘independence’ should mean ‘independence from Government’. 
(Paragraph 73) 
The Government agrees that when used in relation to SACs, ‘independence’ should mean 
independent of government. This is reflected in the current version of the Code of Practice 
for Scientific Advisory Committees which states that: ‘committee’s advice […] should be 
seen as independent of government’.  
The Government will ensure that the independence of SACs from government is clearly 
reflected in the updated Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy-making. 
13. We agree that SACs should recruit members based on competencies. However, we 
are concerned that dropping the term ‘lay’ removes an expectation that specialist 
advisory councils should have non-specialist members. Additionally, we are not 
convinced by the argument that scientists from one subject are necessarily a ‘lay’ person 
in another scientific area. Whether or not they are called ‘lay members’, non-specialists 
do have a lot to offer specialist committees. The presumption should be that SACs have 
lay/non-specialist members. (Paragraph 78) 
The Government agrees that non-specialist members can add value to the functioning of a 
SAC, and would advocate that every SAC consider the inclusion of a ‘lay’ member amongst 
its membership. However, the balance of specialist and non-specialist members on a given 
SAC will reflect the role and remit of the Committee in question. That said, the Committee 
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may be interested to note that—in November 2009—GO-Science will be holding an event 
for SAC members across government to discuss the role of non-specialist members, and 
how best to support their development and working. 
The Government can report that the majority of SACs do count non-specialists among 
their membership. The precise balance of specialist and non-specialist members varies 
considerably, however. For example, the Forensic Science Advisory Council reports having 
11 non-specialist members and 4 specialist members; the Advisory Committee on 
Packaging reports 2 non-specialist members; and the Committee on Medical Aspects of 
Radiation in the Environment has only expert members. The diversity of SACs’ 
membership only serves to highlight the degree to which the optimal structure of a given 
Committee will reflect the nature of the issue on which it advises. 
14. We support the Code of Practice’s emphasis on the importance of publishing 
documents relating to the work of science advisory committees. We would prefer a 
slightly different emphasis on open meetings. Rather than recommending that SACs 
“should aim to hold open meetings on a regular basis”, we suggest that SACs “should 
aim to hold the majority of their meetings in public, making use of new media wherever 
possible”. (Paragraph 82) 
A majority of SACs now hold one meeting in public each year, with a broad range of SACs 
meeting in public on a regular basis. This is indicative of a general move to greater 
transparency, with a number of SACs routinely advertising meeting dates on their websites 
and providing online access to meeting agenda, papers and minutes and SAC reports 
(Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs; Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition; 
and the Advisory Committee on Hazardous Substances, for example). The Committee may 
be interested to note that the Human Genetics Commission makes audio recordings of 
their meetings available to the public. 
15. We can see the logic and agree that it is important that SAC advice should be 
presented to Ministers in advance of publication, giving them sufficient time to 
consider a response. However, it is also clear that SAC advice should, when it is given to 
Ministers, be final advice, and not a launching pad for debate. On this basis, we 
recommend that the process of SACs providing evidence to Ministers should be as 
transparent as possible. SAC evidence that is presented to Ministers should 
subsequently be published in unaltered form, along with the date on which the evidence 
was presented to Ministers and the details of any requests for alterations or 
clarifications of the evidence. (Paragraph 84) 
It is the longstanding view of Government that all independent advice it receives be made 
publicly available as a matter of routine. This view is clearly laid out in the Government’s 
Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy-making (see the Government’s response to 
Recommendation 6 of this report), and, as set out below, in the Code of Practice for 
Science Advisory Committees (CoPSAC): 
Advice should normally be made public by the scientific advisory committee at the 
time it is given or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter. Where there are 
circumstances which justify giving advice in private, committees should consider 
whether the advice could be made public after a suitable time interval has passed. If so, 
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they should publish the advice as soon as is reasonably practicable. Reasons for privacy 
should be consistent with the principles of Freedom of Information legislation [page 
21]. 
16. We recommend that a small press office be set up within the Government Office 
for Science, to serve the press needs of GO-Science and all the Science Advisory 
Committees across Government. (Paragraph 86) 
GO-Science receives press office support from BIS, with the GCSA and GO-Science being 
served by a dedicated press officer. BIS press office and GO-Science are soon to be co-
located, and the Government does not consider a separate GO-Science press office to be 
warranted. 
It is the Government’s view that there is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach to be taken to the 
provision of media support to SACs. In general, SACs receive press office support from 
their sponsor department. Government departments and SACs have close working 
relationships, and the provision of press office support to SACs by their sponsor 
department is not contentious.  
On the rare occasion that a SAC has requested independent media support this has been 
arranged. The Government is therefore of the view that, as is current practice, the precise 
nature of support required by a SAC should be discussed on a case-by-case basis.  
17. Shuffling the body responsible for providing cross-departmental science and 
engineering advice from one department to another and then back again within the 
space of two years is the opposite of ‘putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy’. It reduces science and engineering advice to, at best, a peripheral 
policy concern, and, at worst, a political bargaining chip. If science and engineering are 
to be successfully placed at the heart of policy, as the Government is keen to do, two 
things need to happen. First, the Government Office for Science (and Engineering, as 
we would have it) should have a stable home. We believe that this should be the Cabinet 
Office: the heart of Government. Second, there needs to be a Government Chief 
Engineer and a Government Chief Scientist, who are responsible for cross-
departmental advice and coordination, freeing up the Government Chief Scientific 
(and Engineering) Adviser to advise the Prime Minister more closely and to act as a 
public figurehead for science and engineering in the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 88) 
The Government rejects the Committee’s assertion that the body responsible for providing 
cross-departmental science and engineering advice (now GO-Science) has been ‘shuffled 
about’ over recent years. The GCSA and the office that supports this role have been 
continuously co-located with the department responsible for the Science Budget since 
1995. The Government believes this is the optimal location for the GCSA and GO-Science 
and refers the Committee to its response on Recommendations 2 & 3. 
Debating strategic priorities and the Haldane Principle 
18. We are left wondering what this strategic priorities debate was about and whether 
it has led to a major shift in Government policy. We are in favour of a discussion about 
how best to focus research funds so that the UK gets maximum reward from its 
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investment, but the lesson to be learned is that the Government should be clear in its 
own mind about the format and goals of a debate before launching it. (Paragraph 105) 
25. In the case of the strategic-priorities debate, the benefits of a fast-moving process 
have been countered by a lack of coherence. Launching the debate with a Green Paper 
or something similar would have given a focus to the debate that was sorely lacking. We 
acknowledge that this would have elongated the timeframe for the debate, but since the 
intention was always for an on-going debate, this should not have been seen as a 
problem. (Paragraph 133) 
The Government welcomes the Committee’s acceptance that it should set the over-arching 
strategic priorities for research funding. However, Government does not set priorities in 
isolation: there is continuing dialogue between Government, Research Councils, learned 
societies, research users, and the research community about the strategic priorities for 
research funding. This consultation takes account of changing circumstances. Such 
discussions have in the past informed cross-council programmes such as those set up 
following the Comprehensive Spending Review. The Government has already committed 
to consult more extensively in the run-up to the next Science and Research Budget 
allocation. The debate that Lord Drayson launched earlier this year was set clearly in the 
context of that continuing process. It was timely in light of the turbulent economic climate, 
for at least two reasons: science and research will have a key role driving the economy 
through and out of recession, and it is more important than ever that every pound of 
taxpayer’s money is used as effectively as possible. This timeliness was the reason for the 
rapid and flexible approach taken to the debate, rather than a more formal approach such 
as a Green Paper. 
19. Past experience of failing to accurately ‘pick winners’ has led to a risk-averse 
executive. The belief that ‘sectors will pick themselves’ is misplaced and when proactive 
interventions by Government are not forthcoming, potentially successful industries 
that germinate in the UK, blossom elsewhere. Choosing to support one sector over 
another will be difficult. The Government should develop clear and agreed 
methodologies for determining priorities and acceptability of risk. (Paragraph 109) 
The Committee is right to point out the challenges for Government in making targeted 
interventions to help the economy of the future. The Government laid out in detail its 
approach to this challenging and important task in the policy statement Building Britain's 
Future - New Industry, New Jobs, published on 20th April 2009. 
20. If the Government is to develop clear and agreed methodologies for identifying 
areas of high priority, these must also be effective in identifying areas of low priority. 
Further, the Government should not prevaricate on this issue: if it decides to prioritise 
some areas of research it should come clean about which areas of research will see 
reduced investment. (Paragraph 111) 
The Government does not agree with the Committee that it is necessary or desirable for the 
Government itself to specify which areas of research will receive lower levels of funding. 
Each Research Council decides independently how best to deliver excellent research in 
priority areas, while retaining a broad base of excellent research. They base their approach 
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on the needs and views of their varied research communities and the businesses and public 
bodies with which they work. 
26. Any debate on strategic science funding should be put in the wider context of the 
role of science and engineering in the economic and social wellbeing of the UK. The 
2004 ten-year science and innovation framework was successful in focussing attention 
on the importance of science and innovation. We now suggest that the UK needs a 
‘national science and engineering strategy’. The Government should spend the last two-
years of the ten-year framework (2012 and 2013) reviewing the science and innovation 
framework and consulting on a new strategy that will set out the direction of travel for 
science and engineering within UK plc from 2014 until 2024. (Paragraph 137) 
Halfway through the existing ten year Science and Innovation investment framework 2004–
2014, the Government considers that this Framework continues to be appropriate, and 
substantial progress has been made in achieving the aims set out five years ago. It welcomes 
the Committee’s view that the Framework has been successful. There have continued to be 
annual reports about further progress, and the Innovation Nation White Paper last year 
was a further major step forward. The Government agrees that further evolution will be 
desirable.  
23. It is unlikely that the Science and Society consultation will contribute substantially 
to “a new strategy for the UK”: most of what has been said was either predictable or 
already government policy. However, we will watch the work of the Expert Groups with 
interest. (Paragraph 126) 
Government welcomes the Committee’s interest in the Science and Society work and 
would encourage widespread engagement with the relevant Expert Groups. Whilst the 
initial findings of the Science and Society Strategy consultation did not reveal pressure for 
radical change, it did confirm, at a national level and with the significant support of the vast 
majority of stakeholders, a collective agreement to the priorities set out in the consultation. 
Perhaps more significantly, it confirmed a willingness by a wide number of organisations 
and influential individuals to come together to provide increased momentum and co-
ordination of activities. The consultation revealed that the focus of science and society is 
continually shifting and it was therefore timely to review the science and society 
commitments in the Science and Innovation Investment Framework: 2004–2014. 
The externally-led Expert Groups have been charged with appraising critically the science 
and society landscape, and with testing the responses and key issues which arose from the 
consultation. They will develop long-term delivery plans to address the most important 
issues. Government Departments, Agencies and NDPBs are represented on the groups and 
are fully committed to the process. 
24. We welcome the Government’s commitment to consultation. It would be helpful if 
the Government was clearer about the reasons for each consultation and what was at 
stake. This would make the process more worthwhile for all concerned and would 
remove the feeling of ‘box-ticking’ that so often accompanies consultations. (Paragraph 
132) 
The Government accepts the importance of clarity of aims in consultation, but feels the 
best way to achieve this in practice depends on the nature of the consultation. What is 
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important is that, as John Hutton is quoted in the Committee's report, the consultation is 
"targeted at, and easily accessible to, those with a clear interest in the policy in question". 
The Science and Society consultation was a substantial formal consultation open to the 
public. It complied with the Cabinet Office Code of Practice on Consultation, from which 
John Hutton’s quote is taken, and used not only the basic minimum principles for 
conducting effective Government consultations but new innovative deliberative 
engagement techniques which are already an increasing part of the science and society 
portfolio.  
The debate on strategic priorities was not a formal public consultation but was intended to 
be flexible and responsive, and to engage expert stakeholders who were already very 
familiar with the issues at stake: this allowed the debate to proceed in a much more 
informal manner. The nature of each consultation is always tailored to its audience and 
aims, in compliance with the Code of Practice.  
21. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills should consider long-term 
investment returns when it considers strategic priorities in international partnerships. 
(Paragraph 114) 
The Government agrees. The UK has for a considerable time sought to develop 
international partnerships that can help bring returns in both the shorter and longer terms. 
The UK’s membership of CERN, which dates back to the 1950s, is just one example of this 
approach, which the Government intends to continue. 
22. Curiosity-driven research is a key component of a successful knowledge-economy. 
We strongly endorse the view that increased focus in applied research and industrial 
follow-through should not be at the expense of blue-skies research, which is one of the 
UK’s greatest strengths. (Paragraph 117) 
The Government agrees with the Committee that expanding the frontiers of knowledge 
continues to be of vital importance in its own right, as well as being key to the UK’s future 
economic and social success. The Science and Research Budget will continue to fund such 
research driven by the curiosity of top quality researchers. 
29. To conclude, we are in favour of the idea that researchers are best placed to make 
detailed funding decisions on the one hand and, in principle, we support the 
Government to set the over-arching strategic direction on the other. However, it is 
necessary for the Government to spell out the relationship between these two notions 
for a broader funding principle to be of any use. (Paragraph 157) 
35. We have already given our support for a more strategic approach to setting 
priorities in science funding, specifically at the applied end of the spectrum. 
Considering this issue in the context of the Haldane Principle highlights the need for a 
new approach to science funding that incorporates the good elements of Haldane in 
relation to basic science, but does not hinder a more mission-driven approach to get the 
full benefits of applied science and engineering. (Paragraph 185) 
The Government is clear that the Haldane Principle remains the correct basis for 
governing the allocation of science and research funding. It welcomes the Committee’s 
acceptance of key aspects of the Haldane Principle: that researchers are best placed to make 
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detailed funding decisions on the one hand and that Government should set the over-
arching strategic direction.  
Far from hindering the ability to do both blue-skies and challenge-driven research, the 
Haldane Principle facilitates it. For example, the Research Councils have responded to the 
strategic challenges, identified by Government, of environmental change, ageing, global 
security and sustainable energy with cross-council research programmes that include blue-
skies and directed research. Under this approach, the UK research base is the most 
productive in the G8 (and twice as productive as that of the USA), the UK’s research 
performance is second only to the USA while university income from business and 
external sources has reached its highest level ever.  
27. The 2009 Budget Research Council savings have had an impact on the way that 
Research Councils allocate their funds. While this cannot be regarded as dictating 
‘detailed decisions’, it is not ‘over-arching strategy’ either; it is somewhere in between. 
(Paragraph 155) 
28. These ‘savings’ are in reality a strategic influencing of research funding streams. 
Whether or not it is the right thing to do is open to debate. But, either way, the 
Government should communicate clearly what it is doing and not label them as 
something they are not. (Paragraph 156) 
The Government does not recognise the Committee’s account of the process by which 
Research Councils made commitments to greater efficiency savings as part of Budget 2009.  
As part of the preparations for Budget 2009, all Departments sought to identify where 
further efficiency savings could be made, in addition to those already committed to as part 
of the CSR2007 settlement. After discussion with the Research Councils on the level of 
savings that was feasible, the then Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 
announced that the Research Councils had committed to make an additional £106 million 
of efficiency savings by 2010/11. The Research Councils decided both how these savings 
should be made, and how the funding thereby generated would be best used. 
HM Treasury agreed that, given the importance of science and research, the £106 million 
generated by these efficiency savings should be retained within the Science and Research 
ringfence. This was in contrast to most parts of Government, from which efficiency savings 
had to be passed back to HM Treasury.  
Research Councils then had to decide how to allocate this £106 million. They consulted 
with the research community, including at a public conference in April, on the priorities 
for allocating this money. They subsequently announced these priorities on 18th May. 
The Research Councils decided how the initial efficiency savings should be made, and later 
decided what the priorities should be for allocating the resulting money, once HM 
Treasury had agreed to its being retained. So while the Government agrees that “the 2009 
Budget Research Council savings have had an impact on the way that Research Councils 
allocate their funds”, this is as a result of decisions taken by Research Councils in 
consultation with the research community, not by Government. In accordance with the 
Haldane Principle, the Government did not determine what specific research should be 
funded: Research Councils and researchers did.  
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30. Research Councils are not, and never have been, the ‘guardians of the 
independence of science’. That responsibility has historically lain, and should remain, 
with the learned societies, universities and individual academics. (Paragraph 159) 
Research Councils have a important role to play in ensuring that specific decisions about 
which projects and researchers are funded are at arm’s length from Government. They 
therefore do guard the independence of scientific research. The Government agrees that 
important roles in relation to independence are also played by the learned societies, 
universities and individual academics. The Government values and supports the autonomy 
of universities, and the independent perspective provided by the learned societies. 
31. The Government’s refusal to give us confidential access to papers relevant to this 
inquiry is unacceptable. Without seeing the Science Budget Allocation letters, we are 
forced to speculate that the Government has exerted inappropriate influence over the 
Research Councils. However, we have been unable to confirm or deny this suspicion 
because of the Government’s contempt for Parliamentary scrutiny. (Paragraph 165) 
Far from having contempt for Parliamentary scrutiny, Government welcomes and engages 
with it. In particular, the close and regular attention paid by the Committee to issues 
surrounding research funding is important and valuable to Government. 
There has been no inappropriate influence exerted over the Research Councils. The 
Government published details of the allocation of the Science and Research Budget in 
December 2007, and the Research Councils published their detailed Delivery Plans. As has 
been explained to the Committee, the purpose of not disclosing the process between 
Government and the Research Councils leading up to spending decisions is to promote 
candid discussion and robust appraisal of options. Contemporary disclosure of such 
discussion, or the knowledge that they would be subject to specific scrutiny, would inhibit 
effective preparation of advice to Ministers.  
32. Logically, the Government cannot support both the Excellence and Haldane 
Principles in their current form and be responsible for promoting science and 
engineering as a means of economic recovery and growth in the regions. The time is 
ripe for an unambiguous rationalisation of the two concepts. Researchers, industry, 
regional and national policy makers and the public have a right to know on what basis 
research funding is distributed both nationally and regionally; the rationale for funding 
decisions should be transparent and rigorous. The Government should adjust the 
framework for research funding and regional development so that it does not contain 
internal contradictions. (Paragraph 173) 
33. Science and engineering are crucial to the economic wellbeing of every region in 
the UK, and development strategies that have supported and made use of science and 
engineering have proven successful. In the consideration of UK science policy, it is 
essential that the regional dimension is clearly and publicly set out. It is important that 
the Government is able to communicate its role in regional development and in science 
policy, and especially the relationship between the two. It will only be able to do this if it 
resolves the conflict between its regional policies and the Haldane Principle. 
(Paragraph 176) 
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As the Committee acknowledges in its report, the Government has been clear and 
consistent that 
 “Public funding of research at a national level, through the Research Councils and 
funding bodies, is dedicated to supporting excellent research, irrespective of its UK 
location. The ‘excellence principle’ is fundamental to safeguarding the international 
standing and scientific credibility of the UK science and research and supporting an 
excellent, diverse, expanding and dynamic science base, providing value for money 
for public investment.”2  
The Committee succinctly explains that this “is a good thing because it keeps science 
competitive and sends the money where it is most likely to produce the best results.” This 
principle was stated in the Science and Innovation investment framework 2004–2014 and on 
subsequent occasions, and remains in place. 
The Government sees no contradiction between this principle and recognition of the 
reality that science and innovation are key factors in economic development. Funding is 
allocated to universities and research institutes on the basis of excellence, This funding 
enables researchers to contribute to the economic development of the regions in which 
their research happens to be located as well as to the UK more widely, but the funding is 
not provided with regional development in mind The Government sees no conflict 
between the allocation of research funding on the basis of excellence according to the 
Haldane Principle, and the work of the Regional Development Agencies in promoting 
economic development in their respective regions.  
The Committee refers to Lord Drayson’s evidence in which he acknowledged the regional 
impact of strategic decisions about the location of major pieces of infrastructure. In this 
evidence, he was referring specifically to the few occasions in which Ministerial 
involvement is required, rather than the generality of research funding. The published 
criteria used for the Large Facilities Capital Fund (which is used to provide additional 
funding for most larger public research infrastructure projects) are clear that “the 
opportunities that are opened up for knowledge or technology transfer and innovation” is 
one factor used in making this type of decision, albeit one factor amongst fourteen. 
However, as Lord Drayson made clear in his evidence, when taking these and all decisions 
about research funding “the excellence…is what comes first”. 
34. The relationships between the Government and the research bodies that it funds 
should be both explicit and transparent. We recommend that the different streams of 
research funding are mapped and the nature of the contract between Government and 
the research bodies described. (Paragraph 181) 
36. The time has come for a new framework to replace the Haldane Principle (however 
it is understood) that adds transparency and rigour to the relationship between 
Government and the research community. It is important that the diversity of 
relationships between Government and the various bodies it funds to do research are 
included under a broad set of principles. We recommend that the Council for Science 
and Technology be commissioned to carry out this work. (Paragraph 188) 
 
2 Quoted from 10 Year Framework 
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There are many different types of relationships between the various Government 
Departments and research organisations, and as the Committee points out, “it would be 
inappropriate for the same relationship to exist between each of these organisations and 
Government”. Government is not aware of any instances in which the formal nature of the 
relationship is unclear. The Government does not plan further work to map and describe 
the overall relationship between Government and research bodies.  
In the original Haldane Report, a clear distinction is drawn between “research work for 
general use”, in which Ministers should not take a detailed involvement (this now includes 
funding via the Science and Research Budget following the Haldane Principle), and 
research carried out for the benefit of specific Departments. Haldane writes “many 
Departments must retain under their own control a distinctive organisation for the 
prosecution of specific forms of research.” The Government still agrees that Departments 
should retain control over the distinctive organisation of research for their own purposes. 
As for the Science and Research Budget, Government is clear that the Haldane principle 
remains the correct framework to govern that highly successful set of relationships, and the 
previous Secretary of State John Denham set out clearly in his speech at the Royal Academy 
of Engineering on 29 April 2008 how the Haldane principle applies in a modern context.  
Science and Engineering Scrutiny 
37. Changes to the science and engineering scrutiny programme to make reviews 
shorter and mandatory are welcome. We recommend that there should be regular and 
constructive liaison between the newly formed Science and Technology Committee and 
the Science and Engineering Assurance team. (Paragraph 194) 
We welcome the Committee’s interest in our Science and Engineering Assurance (SEA) 
programme. The SEA reviews are designed to provide information and assurance to both 
the GCSA and Departmental Permanent Secretaries on the state of management and use of 
science in Government. 
The Committee has asked Professor Beddington to appear as an early witness in the new 
S&T Committee work programme. This would be the first opportunity for Professor 
Beddington to update the Committee on the progress of the review programme. Further 
updates could be provided at future evidence sessions. 
While it may not be appropriate to discuss the emerging findings of on-going SEA reviews 
with the Committee we would be pleased to make reports of departmental reviews 
available to the committee on publication. 
38. We would like to thank all those who made strong representation to the Leader of 
the House on our behalf. We also recognise the responsibility that derives from a 
consensus in Parliament and the science and engineering community that science and 
technology scrutiny matters. We will strive to make the work of the new Committee—
which is essential for the democratic scrutiny of science, engineering and technology—
relevant, rigorous and transparent. (Paragraph 207) 
39. The current arrangement for the future Science and Technology Committee is the 
best that could be achieved following the machinery of Government changes. We 
suggest that following the general election the committee responsible for science, 
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engineering and technology policy should be called the Science, Engineering and 
Technology Committee. (Paragraph 210) 
40. We suggest that the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should 
revert to its original 11 members with a quorum of three. (Paragraph 212) 
41. To avoid complications related to the lines of departmental responsibility and 
future machinery of Government changes, we suggest that following the next general 
election the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should be installed as a 
free-standing committee with a cross-departmental remit for science and engineering 
including research budgets across Government. (Paragraph 214) 
The Government welcomes the re-establishment of the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Select Committee, a move Lord Drayson and Professor Beddington have 
publicly supported. As outlined in the response to Recommendation 31, the Government 
values Parliamentary scrutiny and has appreciated the work of the IUSS Select Committee.  
The Government notes the Committee’s suggestions for changes to the name, membership 
and remit of the Committee and agrees with the Committee’s view that any further 
significant changes of this kind would be better carried out at the beginning of the next 
Parliament. 
Conclusion 
42. We close this inquiry by urging the Government to raise its game. When it turns its 
attention to updating the Science Framework, we recommend that the Government 
consult widely with a view to producing a successor ten-year science and engineering 
strategy that is both tangible and ambitious. We suggest that built into this strategy-in 
the spirit of scientific and engineering endeavour-should be an assessment of what 
benefits, if any, are delivered by putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy. (Paragraph 216) 
As we hope is made clear above, the Government agrees with the Committee on the 
importance of science and engineering to the development and delivery of government 
policy. On the issue of updating the Science Framework, we refer the Committee to the 
response to Recommendation 26. 
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Appendix 2: Conclusions and 
recommendations 
Science and engineering at the heart of Government policy? 
1. We were impressed by the Science Minister and Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s 
frank assessment of how science and engineering advice is used in Government. We 
were pleased to hear that they have taken up those concerns we raised in the 
engineering report and that they have an appetite to improve the use of evidence in 
policy-making. (Paragraph 24) 
Previous recommendations and policy examples 
2. We regret that the Government failed to answer the core reasons for having 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers. We urge the Government to give fuller 
consideration to our recommendation that “Some departments should have 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief 
Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), and some should have both.” (Paragraph 29) 
3. The Government had an opportunity at the last reshuffle to move GO-Science as per 
our recommendation in the engineering report. That it did not, was a missed 
opportunity. As the Government Chief Scientific Adviser explained, location matters 
because it affords daily face-to-face interaction between colleagues in the same 
building; and as he further pointed out, he has only seen the Prime Minster four times 
in the past year. We therefore appeal directly to the Prime Minster, who is responsible 
for GO-Science, to bring it into the Cabinet Office alongside the Strategy Unit. 
(Paragraph 37) 
4. We are reassured to hear that Professor Beddington will take steps to look at the 
MHRA’s decision to licence homeopathic products as well as the wider issue of the 
purchasing of homeopathy by the NHS. We hope that he will be able to bring scientific 
evidence to the centre of this complex policy issue. (Paragraph 42) 
5. We call on the DCSF Chief Scientific Adviser to explain what advice she provided, if 
any, on the Every Child literacy and numeracy programmes and report it to the House. 
(Paragraph 47) 
Science Advisory Councils/Committees 
6. We agree with Professor Beddington that Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers 
should have devolved responsibility for the quality of scientific advice in each 
department. On that basis, it is crucial that each DCSA has a tight grip on their 
departmental remits and have sufficient support so that problem policy areas can be 
identified and dealt with. The DCSA must challenge policy-makers to demonstrate 
clear evidence to support policy or to acknowledge that no such evidence exists. The 
GCSA needs to be advised by DCSAs of those instances where DCSAs have been 
overruled on such matters; and we further recommend that he publishes these in his 
annual report. (Paragraph 48) 
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7. Strong consideration should be given to increasing the number of departments that 
have Science Advisory Councils with a departmental remit. The Department of Health, 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Department for Transport are 
obvious ‘top-of-the-list’ candidates, with the latter two in particular needing high 
quality engineering advice. (Paragraph 54) 
8. SAC members should not be criticised for publishing scientific papers or making 
statements as professionals, independent of their role as Government advisers. 
(Paragraph 64) 
9. It is important to safeguard the independence of the advisory system. In situations 
where the independence of a SAC chairman or member is or might be threatened for 
political reasons, support should be offered by the DCSA and/or the GCSA.  
(Paragraph 67) 
10. We welcome the steps taken by the GCSA to deal with one incident that occurred 
between the Chairman of the ACMD and the Home Secretary. Further steps that 
should have been taken are: (1) the GSCA should have written or spoken to the 
Chairman of the ACMD, letting him know that support was being provided; (2) the 
correspondence between the GCSA and the Home Secretary should have been 
published immediately so that other SAC Chairmen and the public (including the 
science community) could see that support was being offered; and (3) the GCSA 
should have provided public support for the Chairman of the ACMD and for his right 
to publish.  (Paragraph 68) 
11. The Government should seek specialist advice prior to making policy decisions, early 
in the policy-making process. Clearly the Government should be free to reject the 
advice of its SACs, since scientific evidence is only one factor—albeit a very important 
one—in policy decisions: Advisers advise, Ministers decide. However, when the 
Government does take a different policy decision to that recommended by a SAC, it 
should make clear its reasons for doing so. (Paragraph 69) 
12. We conclude that there would be value in being clear in the Code of Practice as to what 
‘independence’ means. Members of Science Advisory Committees are likely to 
represent the views of their constituencies; what is important is that they have no 
conflict of interest with Government. Therefore, in the case of Science Advisory 
Committees, ‘independence’ should mean ‘independence from Government’. 
(Paragraph 73) 
13. We agree that SACs should recruit members based on competencies. However, we are 
concerned that dropping the term ‘lay’ removes an expectation that specialist advisory 
councils should have non-specialist members. Additionally, we are not convinced by 
the argument that scientists from one subject are necessarily a ‘lay’ person in another 
scientific area. Whether or not they are called ‘lay members’, non-specialists do have a 
lot to offer specialist committees. The presumption should be that SACs have lay/non-
specialist members. (Paragraph 78) 
14. We support the Code of Practice’s emphasis on the importance of publishing 
documents relating to the work of science advisory committees. We would prefer a 
slightly different emphasis on open meetings. Rather than recommending that SACs 
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“should aim to hold open meetings on a regular basis”, we suggest that SACs “should 
aim to hold the majority of their meetings in public, making use of new media 
wherever possible”. (Paragraph 82)  
15. We can see the logic and agree that it is important that SAC advice should be presented 
to Ministers in advance of publication, giving them sufficient time to consider a 
response. However, it is also clear that SAC advice should, when it is given to Ministers, 
be final advice, and not a launching pad for debate. On this basis, we recommend that 
the process of SACs providing evidence to Ministers should be as transparent as 
possible. SAC evidence that is presented to Ministers should subsequently be published 
in unaltered form, along with the date on which the evidence was presented to 
Ministers and the details of any requests for alterations or clarifications of the evidence. 
(Paragraph 84) 
16. We recommend that a small press office be set up within the Government Office for 
Science, to serve the press needs of GO-Science and all the Science Advisory 
Committees across Government. (Paragraph 86) 
Conclusion 
17. Shuffling the body responsible for providing cross-departmental science and 
engineering advice from one department to another and then back again within the 
space of two years is the opposite of ‘putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy’. It reduces science and engineering advice to, at best, a peripheral 
policy concern, and, at worst, a political bargaining chip. If science and engineering are 
to be successfully placed at the heart of policy, as the Government is keen to do, two 
things need to happen. First, the Government Office for Science (and Engineering, as 
we would have it) should have a stable home. We believe that this should be the 
Cabinet Office: the heart of Government. Second, there needs to be a Government 
Chief Engineer and a Government Chief Scientist, who are responsible for cross-
departmental advice and coordination, freeing up the Government Chief Scientific 
(and Engineering) Adviser to advise the Prime Minister more closely and to act as a 
public figurehead for science and engineering in the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 88)  
Debating strategic priorities
18. We are left wondering what this strategic priorities debate was about and whether it 
has led to a major shift in Government policy. We are in favour of a discussion about 
how best to focus research funds so that the UK gets maximum reward from its 
investment, but the lesson to be learned is that the Government should be clear in its 
own mind about the format and goals of a debate before launching it.  (Paragraph 105) 
19. Past experience of failing to accurately ‘pick winners’ has led to a risk-averse executive. 
The belief that ‘sectors will pick themselves’ is misplaced and when proactive 
interventions by Government are not forthcoming, potentially successful industries 
that germinate in the UK, blossom elsewhere. Choosing to support one sector over 
another will be difficult. The Government should develop clear and agreed 
methodologies for determining priorities and acceptability of risk. (Paragraph 109) 
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20. If the Government is to develop clear and agreed methodologies for identifying areas of 
high priority, these must also be effective in identifying areas of low priority. Further, 
the Government should not prevaricate on this issue: if it decides to prioritise some 
areas of research it should come clean about which areas of research will see reduced 
investment. (Paragraph 111) 
21. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills should consider long-term 
investment returns when it considers strategic priorities in international partnerships. 
(Paragraph 114)  
22. Curiosity-driven research is a key component of a successful knowledge-economy. We 
strongly endorse the view that increased focus in applied research and industrial 
follow-through should not be at the expense of blue-skies research, which is one of the 
UK’s greatest strengths. (Paragraph 117) 
23. It is unlikely that the Science and Society consultation will contribute substantially to “a 
new strategy for the UK”: most of what has been said was either predictable or already 
government policy. However, we will watch the work of the Expert Groups with 
interest. (Paragraph 126)  
24. We welcome the Government’s commitment to consultation. It would be helpful if the 
Government was clearer about the reasons for each consultation and what was at stake. 
This would make the process more worthwhile for all concerned and would remove 
the feeling of ‘box-ticking’ that so often accompanies consultations.(Paragraph 132) 
25. In the case of the strategic-priorities debate, the benefits of a fast-moving process have 
been countered by a lack of coherence. Launching the debate with a Green Paper or 
something similar would have given a focus to the debate that was sorely lacking. We 
acknowledge that this would have elongated the timeframe for the debate, but since the 
intention was always for an on-going debate, this should not have been seen as a 
problem. (Paragraph 133)  
26. Any debate on strategic science funding should be put in the wider context of the role 
of science and engineering in the economic and social wellbeing of the UK. The 2004 
ten-year science and innovation framework was successful in focussing attention on 
the importance of science and innovation. We now suggest that the UK needs a 
‘national science and engineering strategy’. The Government should spend the last 
two-years of the ten-year framework (2012 and 2013) reviewing the science and 
innovation framework and consulting on a new strategy that will set out the direction 
of travel for science and engineering within UK plc from 2014 until 2024. (Paragraph 
137)  
The Haldane Principle 
27. The 2009 Budget Research Council savings have had an impact on the way that 
Research Councils allocate their funds. While this cannot be regarded as dictating 
‘detailed decisions’, it is not ‘over-arching strategy’ either; it is somewhere in between. 
(Paragraph 155) 
28. These ‘savings’ are in reality a strategic influencing of research funding streams. 
Whether or not it is the right thing to do is open to debate. But, either way, the 
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Government should communicate clearly what it is doing and not label them as 
something they are not. (Paragraph 156) 
29. To conclude, we are in favour of the idea that researchers are best placed to make 
detailed funding decisions on the one hand and, in principle, we support the 
Government to set the over-arching strategic direction on the other. However, it is 
necessary for the Government to spell out the relationship between these two notions 
for a broader funding principle to be of any use. (Paragraph 157) 
30. Research Councils are not, and never have been, the ‘guardians of the independence of 
science’. That responsibility has historically lain, and should remain, with the learned 
societies, universities and individual academics. (Paragraph 159) 
31. The Government’s refusal to give us confidential access to papers relevant to this 
inquiry is unacceptable. Without seeing the Science Budget Allocation letters, we are 
forced to speculate that the Government has exerted inappropriate influence over the 
Research Councils. However, we have been unable to confirm or deny this suspicion 
because of the Government’s contempt for Parliamentary scrutiny. (Paragraph 165) 
32. Logically, the Government cannot support both the Excellence and Haldane Principles 
in their current form and be responsible for promoting science and engineering as a 
means of economic recovery and growth in the regions. The time is ripe for an 
unambiguous rationalisation of the two concepts. Researchers, industry, regional and 
national policy makers and the public have a right to know on what basis research 
funding is distributed both nationally and regionally; the rationale for funding 
decisions should be transparent and rigorous. The Government should adjust the 
framework for research funding and regional development so that it does not contain 
internal contradictions. (Paragraph 173)  
33. Science and engineering are crucial to the economic wellbeing of every region in the 
UK, and development strategies that have supported and made use of science and 
engineering have proven successful. In the consideration of UK science policy, it is 
essential that the regional dimension is clearly and publicly set out. It is important that 
the Government is able to communicate its role in regional development and in science 
policy, and especially the relationship between the two. It will only be able to do this if 
it resolves the conflict between its regional policies and the Haldane Principle. 
(Paragraph 176)  
34. The relationships between the Government and the research bodies that it funds 
should be both explicit and transparent. We recommend that the different streams of 
research funding are mapped and the nature of the contract between Government and 
the research bodies described. (Paragraph 181) 
35. We have already given our support for a more strategic approach to setting priorities in 
science funding, specifically at the applied end of the spectrum. Considering this issue 
in the context of the Haldane Principle highlights the need for a new approach to 
science funding that incorporates the good elements of Haldane in relation to basic 
science, but does not hinder a more mission-driven approach to get the full benefits of 
applied science and engineering. (Paragraph 185) 
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Science and engineering scrutiny 
36. The time has come for a new framework to replace the Haldane Principle (however it is 
understood) that adds transparency and rigour to the relationship between 
Government and the research community. It is important that the diversity of 
relationships between Government and the various bodies it funds to do research are 
included under a broad set of principles. We recommend that the Council for Science 
and Technology be commissioned to carry out this work. (Paragraph 188)  
37. Changes to the science and engineering scrutiny programme to make reviews shorter 
and mandatory are welcome. We recommend that there should be regular and 
constructive liaison between the newly formed Science and Technology Committee 
and the Science and Engineering Assurance team. (Paragraph 194) 
38. We would like to thank all those who made strong representation to the Leader of the 
House on our behalf. We also recognise the responsibility that derives from a 
consensus in Parliament and the science and engineering community that science and 
technology scrutiny matters. We will strive to make the work of the new Committee—
which is essential for the democratic scrutiny of science, engineering and technology—
relevant, rigorous and transparent. (Paragraph 207) 
39. The current arrangement for the future Science and Technology Committee is the best 
that could be achieved following the machinery of Government changes. We suggest 
that following the general election the committee responsible for science, engineering 
and technology policy should be called the Science, Engineering and Technology 
Committee. (Paragraph 210)  
40. We suggest that the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should revert to 
its original 11 members with a quorum of three. (Paragraph 212)  
41. To avoid complications related to the lines of departmental responsibility and future 
machinery of Government changes, we suggest that following the next general election 
the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should be installed as a free-
standing committee with a cross-departmental remit for science and engineering 
including research budgets across Government. (Paragraph 214)  
Conclusions 
42. We close this inquiry by urging the Government to raise its game. When it turns its 
attention to updating the Science Framework, we recommend that the Government 
consult widely with a view to producing a successor ten-year science and engineering 
strategy that is both tangible and ambitious. We suggest that built into this strategy—in 
the spirit of scientific and engineering endeavour—should be an assessment of what 
benefits, if any, are delivered by putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy. (Paragraph 216) 
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